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Testing for the Efficiency of a 
Policy Intended to Meet Objectives: 
General Model and Application 
Klaus Salhofer, Erwin Schmid, and Gerhard Streicher 
This study presents a general model demonstrating  how to measure the (idefficiency 
of  a policy intended to meet objectives. If it is assumed that the government has 
available only those policy instruments it actually utilizes, our method is a test as 
to whether the government combines these instruments efficiently. In addition, one 
could also include other policy instruments, which are not actually used, but are 
available to the government. Our general model is applied to bread grain policy in 
Austria. The primary result is that this policy was quite inefficient in meeting the 
two main objectives of  farm income support and self-sufficiency. The stochastic 
nature of our efficiency measures is acknowledged by taking into account the inherent 
uncertainty of  model parameters. A response surface function is used to identify 
those parameters which contribute most to model output uncertainty. 
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Introduction 
Economists regularly judge the efficiency of a policy according to the deadweight losses 
(DWL)  it  generates. More specifically,  they compare the  welfare outcome of a particular 
policy with the non-intervention situation. Since the early work of  Griliches (1958), 
measuring net welfare changes of government intervention has been utilized by agricul- 
tural economists. [See  Winters (1987a)  for a review of more recent studies measuring the 
DWL of agricultural policy interventions.] However, this practice also has an  equally long 
history of criticism from many renowned agricultural economists (e.g., Nerlove, 1958; 
Josling, 1969,1974;  Rausser, 1982;  Gardner, 1983;  Just, 1984),  because measuring DWL 
does not consider that (agricultural)  policy is intended to achieve specific objectives as 
defined in farm bills or national agricultural acts.' As Josling  wrote, "Accost7  calculation 
is of no interest unless it  can be tied to the magnitude of desired effect for which the cost 
is endured" (p. 242). Consequently, agricultural economists have developed measures 
that in some way take into account at  least what is considered to be the most important 
objective of agricultural policy in developed countries-farm  income support. For 
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example, Nerlove (1958) suggested a measure of "relative social cost" (= DWL per $ of 
income transfer to farmers), and Gardner (1983) suggested a measure of "average 
transfer efficiency" (income  transfer to farmers per $ costs to non-farmers). While these 
frequently used measures [see Bullock, Salhofer, and Kola (1999) for a review] give 
insights into the ratio between costs and benefits of  a policy, they neither answer the 
question of how close the policy is to the optimum, i.e., how (in)eEcient  it  is, nor do they 
consider that agricultural policies often try to meet several objectives at  the same time. 
The present study seeks to close this gap. To judge a policy intended to meet specific 
objectives, we argue that this policy should be compared with an optimal policy which 
achieves the same objectives, but at  minimum DWL. A general model is presented for 
measuring the  (in)efficiency  of a policy aiming to achieve specific objectives, independent 
from the  number of objectives and instruments considered, and for illustration purposes 
is applied to the Austrian bread grain policy between 1991 and 1993. 
Another interesting  feature of this study is its approach in dealing with model param- 
eter uncertainty in policy analysis. Instead of  assuming only one or a few different 
values for each model parameter, we assume an entire plausible distribution. These 
plausible parameter distributions are used to derive probability distributions of policy 
measures, reflecting researchers'  uncertainty about parameter values. Though this 
approach is not completely novel (e.g., Davis and Espinoza, 1998; Zhao et al., 2000; 
Alston, Chalfant, and Piggott, 2000; Jeong, Garcia, and Bullock, 2003), to our knowledge 
only Horan, Claassen, and Howe (2001) have applied this technique to a complex non- 
linear optimization problem comparable to our work. Moreover, building on Zhao et al. 
(2000), we use a response surface methodology to identify those parameters which add 
most to the uncertainty in the  model output, and also discuss how commonly used sensi- 
tivity elasticities can be misleading in finding these parameters. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss theoretically how 
to measure the efficiency of  a policy intended to meet specific objectives. Next, we 
examine how to deal with the uncertainty of model parameters. These methods are  then 
applied to the  Austrian bread grain policy before EU accession (1991-19931. Results are 
summarized, and the paper ends with a general discussion and concluding remarks. 
How to Measure the Efficiency of a Policy 
Intended to Meet Objectives 
(Agricultural) policy is usually intended to meet certain objectives. For example, assume 
a hypothetical situation where the only objective of  agricultural policy is to be self- 
sufficient with regard to agricultural products, but this is not the case in a non-inter- 
vention situation. Figure 1  provides a very simple illustration of this situation, where 
S represents domestic supply,  D is domestic demand, and  P, indicates the world market 
price, infinitely elastic for a small country. In a non-intervention situation, domestic 
demand (Q,) exceeds domestic supply (Q,) for this country, and self-sufficiency is not 
attained.2 
To achieve self-sufficiency, government must create an incentive for agricultural 
producers, like a production subsidy s = P, - P,.  Producers gain a + b + c + d + e +  f  + g, 
We are aware that self-sufficiency, like every other objective of agricultural policy, permits alternative interpretations. 
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Figure 1. Floor price versus production subsidy with self- 
sufficiency and income transfer objectives 
while taxpayers lose a + b + c + d + e + f + g + h + i, implying DWL of h + i. The 
existence of DWL does not necessarily imply the utilized policy is inefficient, in the 
sense that it achieves the policy objectives at  minimum social costs. To judge the effi- 
ciency of a production subsidy, one has  to answer if and by how much government could 
have done better by implementing alternative policies. Therefore, the DWL created by 
the production  subsidy must be contrasted with the DWL created by all other 
policies available to government, which at  the same time meet the self-sufficiency 
objective. 
Using our simple model in figure 1, let us assume that government can only choose 
between the  implemented production subsidy and an  alternative tariff policy. The tariff 
required to  become self-sufficient is t,  indicating a domestic price of P,.  This would imply 
producer gains of a + b + g,  consumer costs of a + b + g + i, and DWL of i. Hence, given 
that self-sufficiency is the only policy objective, and government has only these two 
alternative policies from which to choose (and abstracting from administrative costs, 
transaction costs, and costs of raising public funds), the tariff policy would be deemed 
efficient, since it causes  the  lowest possible DWL. Furthermore, because there  is  a policy 
available that  results in lower DWL to  reach the same objective, the  production subsidy 
policy might be deemed inefficient. Moreover, we might divide the DWL generated by 154  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
the production subsidy policy (i + h) into two parts: area h represents avoidable dead- 
weight losses (ADWL), and area i represents unavoidable deadweight losses (UDWL), 
given the objective of  self-sufficiency  and the availability of these two policies. 
Now,  assume that in addition to self-sufficiency, a certain level of  farm income 
(welfare) transfer is a second objective of agricultural policy. Further assume that the 
intended income transfer is equal to area a + b + c + d +  e  + f  +g  in figure 1. To achieve 
such an amount with a production subsidy (and at the same time derive at least 
self-sufficiency),  government must implement a production subsidy of s, again causing 
DWL of i + h. Since j  = b + d + e + f  + g  + I, a farm income transfer equal to that of  a 
production subsidy policy s is derived by introducing a tariff oft ', yielding a domestic 
price of Pi and DWL of b + d + e + g  + i + k + I. Hence, in meeting both objectives of a 
farm income transfer of a + b + c + d + e + f  + g  and self-sufficiency, the production 
subsidy policy is more efficient: b + d + e + g  + k  + I > h, since e +g  = h. Looking at the 
tariff policy, area b + d + k + I represents ADWL, and area e +  g  + i represents UDWL, 
given the two assumed objectives and two assumed instruments. 
Clearly, the situation becomes more complicated and difficult to depict graphically as 
the number of instruments and objectives increases. In a multi-instrument world govern- 
ment can not only use more than one instrument at  a time, but also can combine these 
instruments at  different levels. However, to test if a policy is efficient in meeting stated 
objectives, one has to ask if some of the DWL caused in fulfilling policy objectives might 
have been avoidable. 
The optimal policy (the one without any ADWL) is the one which fulfills all objectives 
at  minimum DWL. Technically, let x = (x,, x,, .  .  .,  x,;  x,,,,  .  .  .  ,  x,)  be a vector of n policy 
instruments, where m instruments are actually used by government in the current 
policy (or used in the policy to be analyzed), and n -  m instruments are available and 
known, but are not used at  present.3  The existing policy might be a mix of a target price 
x,, a loan rate x,,  and a set-aside requirement x,,  while, for example, a fertilizer tax 
x,,,  is not in place. 
Each instrument can be set at  various levels. A specific government policy is described 
by a vector of the values of all available policy instruments; e.g., policy A is described 
by xA  = (x;,  .  .  .  ,  x:)  and policy B is described by xB  = (xf, .  .  .  ,  xf), where the policies not 
used are corner solutions (e.g., the fertilizer tax x,  = 0). Let the non-intervention policy 
be denoted by x0  = (x:  .  .  .  ,  xi).  Furthermore, let b = (b,, .. ., b,:l  be avector of o parameter 
values describing the  utilized economic model (Bullock,  1994).  Here, b, might be an  elas- 
ticity of wheat demand of  -0.3, b,  might be an elasticity of substitution between labor 
and capital of 0.9, b,  might be a factor share of labor for wheat production of 0.3, and so 
forth. Welfare of individual (or social group at an  aggregated level)  i is a function of policy 
and market conditions: ui  = u,(x,  b). The DWL are the sum of welfare changes initiated 
by a policy A as compared to a non-intervention situation 0: DWL A  = - [Au, + .  .  .  + Au,  I = 
- [(u1(xA,  b) - ui(xO,  b))  + ... + (up(xA,  b) - up(xO,  b))]  = DWL(xO,  xA,  b), where p  is the 
number of individuals (or social groups). 
As one reviewer correctly pointed out, not all available (existing) policies might be known to government andlor the 
researcher. Since the full set of x is never known, our vector of optimal instruments x'  is most likely not the solution to the 
problem  in a global sense. It will always depend  on what instruments we assume to be  available and known to the 
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In addition, assume that agricultural policy has r policy objectives: z,, .  .. ,  zr.  Let zf be 
a specific value by which a policy objective can be made operational; e.g., zf might be a 
self-sufficiency  ratio of  loo%,  zg  a farm income of $50,000 per year, zi a threshold value 
of  45 milligrams nitrate per liter of groundwater, and zf a limit of 20 million tons of 
subsidized wheat exports. Then, z+  = (zl+,  .  .  ., 2:)  is avector that  describes the specific set 
of objectives of  agricultural policy. 
The optimal (efficient) policy  is the one which minimizes DWL  given that policy 
objectives are f~lfilled:~ 
min DWL(x, xO,  b), 
X 
The optimal policy vector which solves optimization problem (1)  is x*, and the lowest 
possible deadweight losses (given policy objectives  are  z')  are  DWL(x*,  xO,  b).  Depending 
on which policy instruments are included in the vector of choice variables x in the opti- 
mization problem (I),  the term "optimal policy" must be interpreted in different ways. 
If  x = (x, ,  x2,  .  .  .  ,  X,  1, X* gives the optimal mix of  actually used policy instruments. If 
x = (x,, x2, ..  .  ,  x,;  x,,~, .  .  .  ,  x,),  X* gives the optimal mix not only of  policy instruments 
actually used, but also of a set of policy instruments which are not used but are avail- 
able (considered known). Instead of minimizing DWL, one could also maximize the sum 
of welfare over allp individuals or social groups: W = ul(x,  b)  + ... + u,(x, b)  = W(x, bX5 
Avoidable DWL of a specific (observed, past, proposed) policy described by d  (ADWL) 
is given by 
(2)  ADWL  = DWL(+, b) - DWL(X*,  b), 
while unavoidable DWL of policy d  (UDWL) is 
(3)  UDWL  = DWL(x*,  b). 
ADWL gives an absolute measure of  how much better government could have done. 
Since ADWL does not necessarily provide a good intuition of the efficiency of a policy, 
here we use the percentage ADWL (%ADWL): 
For a unique solution to exist, DWL(x, x", b) must be twice continuously differentiable and a strictly convex function. 
Finding the optimal policy is to some extent related to the theory of optimal economic policy as  established by Tinbergen 
(1952) and Theil(1954). Their approach translated in our notations can be described as  follows. Let z be a vector of target 
variables (comparable to our policy objectives), x a vector of policy instrument variables, and b a vector of other exogenous 
variables, comparable to our parameters. Hence, the level of target variables depends on policy instruments and exogenous 
factors: z = f(x,  b). The objective function Vis not the sum of individuals' (groups') welfare, but rather a (weighted) function 
of target variables. The policy problem then is to maximize the objective function subject to the restrictions: 
maxV(z), 8.t. z = f(x,  b). 
The objective function can include all targets, or only part of all targets,  while for the others fixed values are chosen: 
zt = fj(x,  b) for some i (Johansen, 1965; Hallett, 1989). In the extreme case where all target values are fixed, the maximi- 
zation problem is replaced by a set of equations to be solved: solve z+ = f(x, b) for x. Obviously, the existence of a solution 
requires the famous order condition; i.e., the number of instrument variables should be at least as  large as the number of 
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where %ADWL is the percentage of  actually observed DWL  that is avoidable, given 
policy objectives z+  are fulfilled. If x = (x,, x,,  .  .  .  ,  x,),  %ADWL  can be interpreted as  the 
percentage of  DWL which could be avoided by government by using the same instru- 
ments, but at  different (optimal)  levels. If x = (x,, x,, ...,  x,;  x,,,,  ...,  x,),  %ADWL gives 
the percentage of DWL which could be avoided by government also considering other 
instruments and combining all instruments in an optimal way. Obviously, if the only 
policy objective is to redistribute welfare, and the set of  available policy instruments 
would include lump-sum transfers and lump-sum taxes, ADWL = DWL, and our frame- 
work would be redundant. However, agricultural policy usually has a number of objec- 
tives (Winters, 1987b), and at least lump-sum taxes are regarded as only a theoretical 
option (Alston and Hurd, 1990; Moschini and Sckokai, 1994; Chambers, 1995). 
Dealing with Parameter Uncertainty 
Policy measures as described above (DWL, ADWL, UDWL, %ADWL) are functions of 
parameter values and policy instrument levels. Let @ be such a policy measure. Then, 
@  = f(x, b). Assuming some specific functional forms of  the relations describing the 
economic system (e.g., log-linear demand and supply functions), then @ of  a specific 
policy (e.g., #)  depends solely on the assumed parameter values. However, since there 
usually is some uncertainty about parameter values, it is more realistic to assume a 
probability density function for the parameters cp(b). This implies a probability distri- 
bution of the policy measure a: 
To derive 8(@),  at least three methods have been utilized? 
If a data set Y is available and sufficient to econometrically estimate all parameters 
of b,  one could use bootstrapping procedures (Efron, 1979; Freedman and Peters, 
1984).  Instead of running one regression and deriving one set of parameters b, one 
would create a large number T of  new data sets (Y  l, Y  2, .  .  .  ,  Y  T, from the original 
data  set by resampling either from the empirical error distribution or from the data 
set directly, and then use these T data sets to estimate T values for each parameter. 
As a result, T parameter sets  can be derived (bl,  b2, .  .  .  ,  bT)  which describe the prob- 
ability density function cp(b).  Substituting  these T parameter sets  into equation (5), 
T estimates are derived of the policy measure (a1,  .  .  .  ,  QT)  which describe the prob- 
ability distribution e(@). 
Alternatively, one could use only the original data set Y,  run only one regression, 
and use the estimated parameter values, the variance-covariance matrix, and the 
assumption that parameters are distributed normally, to Monte Carlo simulate the 
probability distribution of  policy measure €I(@)  (Krinsky and Robb, 1986). If the 
estimated parameter values are actually distributed normally, the bootstrapping 
procedure and the Monte Carlo simulations yield the same results. Clearly, the 
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advantage of  the Monte Carlo simulation is that it is computationally cheaper, 
while bootstrapping is theoretically more accurate (as  it does not critically depend 
on the assumption of normally distributed parameter values being reasonable). 
For many policy analysis models, however, neither is it within the scope of  the 
study to derive the needed set of  parameters, starting from raw data, nor are 
estimation results (including a variance-covariance matrix) for exactly such a 
parameter set available. In this case one can use a procedure discussed in Davis 
and Espinoza (1998); GriEths and Zhao (2000); Davis and Espinoza (2000); and 
Zhao et al. (2000).  As typically used in Bayesian inference, a subjective probability 
distribution for the parameter set q(b) is formed utilizing all information avail- 
able-e.g.,  published econometric estimates, own calculations, and theoretically 
required restrictions. (Typically, the only information available consists of  a few 
point estimates of  each parameter from the literature. In this case, one could 
determine a plausible parameter range and assume a specific distribution within 
this range. Theoretically, covariances between parameters can be considered, but 
often are not available.) From this subjective probability distribution, a large 
number T of  parameter sets (bl,  .. ., bT)  is drawn randomly and used to derive a 
probability distribution of policy measure 0(@).  Obviously, the Monte Carlo proce- 
dure is a special case of this Bayesian approach when a variance-covariance matrix 
of  all parameters is available. 
Empirical Example 
The  Model 
The Austrian bread grain policy just prior to European Union (EU) accession (1991-1993) 
serves as  an empirical example. As represented graphically in figure 2, and analytically 
in the appendix, the Austrian bread grain sector is modeled by a log-linear, three-stage, 
vertically structured model including upstream industries (inputs  necessary to produce 
bread grain) and the downstream industry (food processing and distribution). 
The first stage  includes four markets of input factors used for bread grain production: 
land, labor, durable investment goods (machinery and buildings), and operating inputs 
(fertilizer, seeds, pesticides, etc.). Since farmers own 95% of the farmland, and 86% of 
the laborers in the agricultural sector in Austria are self-employed, land and labor are 
assumed to be factors offered solely by farmers. Because there are many farmers 
supplying land and labor and there are no substantial barriers to entry, a competitive 
market structure is chosen for the land and labor markets. 
Investment goods and operating inputs are supplied by upstream industries. These 
inputs as defined in the model are conglomerates of separate industries in at  least two 
vertical stages (production and trade). Investment goods are comprised of agricultural 
machinery and agricultural buildings, and operating  inputs include fertilizer, pesticides, 
seeds, energy, and insurance. For this reason, the market structure of  these aggrega- 
tions of industries is difficult to define. 
While strong competition might be observed in the building industry, one clearly can 
see some concentration in the machinery industry. For example, according to BMLF 
(19971, the two Austrian tractor brands (Steyrer and Lindner) held 54% of  the market 158  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Figure 2. Three-stage vertical structured model of Austrian 
bread grain market 
share in 1996. Similar observations can be made with respect to some operating inputs. 
Three firms (RWA, Saatbau Linz, and Pioneer) had a share of  62% in the seed market 
in 1995 (BMLF, 1996). For commercial fertilizer, two Austrian firms (Agro Linz and 
Donau Chemie AG) had at least 66% of  the market. Moreover, there was a strong 
concentration in trade of agricultural  machinery and operating inputs. One firm (RWA) 
traded about 75% of  the pesticides, 70% of  the fertilizer, and 40% of  the agricultural 
machinery. Given this information, it is assumed upstream industries are able to exert 
some market power and set the prices above marginal cost. 
For simplicity, export and import of input factors are not considered. While this seems 
reasonable for land and agricultural labor, some further remarks are necessary with 
regard to industrially produced input factors. Defining the share of investment goods 
and operating inputs produced domestically is not an easy task. First, both input cate- 
gories are conglomerates of  separate industries. Second, Austria has simultaneously 
been an importer and exporter for most inputs. Nevertheless, some relevant comments 
can be noted. Over the 1991-1993 study period, the value of imports of  wheat and rye 
seeds was below 1%  of farmers' expenditures for these inputs; however, there certainly 
have been some license fees paidto foreign seed firms. kustria was a net exporter of 
fertilizer with a self-sufficiency ratio (defined as  the value produced divided by domestic 
consumption) of 1.3. The value of imports of commercial fertilizer and manufactured raw 
materials was about 30% of  domestic expenditures for this input. Because we cannot 
classify how much of the imported raw materials have been manufactured and exported 
again, this 30% is only an upper bound of  the market share of  imports. The self- 
sufficiency ratio of  agricultural machinery was 0.92. Again, since Austria was an 
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machinery is hard to define, but according  to our calculations was at  least 60%. Clearly, 
for  some input factors, imports are negligible, e.g.,  agricultural buildings or hail 
insurance. Given these observations and considering the cost share of each input factor 
(e.g., fertilizer, seeds, machinery) within the two defined categories of operating inputs 
and durable investment goods, the most extreme (lowest) estimate of how much of the 
market value is produced domestically is about 75% for both categories. 
At the second stage of the model, input factors of the first stage are used to produce 
bread grain. The first and second stages are linked by the assumption that bread grain 
producers maximize their profits. Based on the observations of  many suppliers, no 
substantial barriers to entry, and farmers being price takers, we  use the standard 
assumption of  a perfectly competitive agricultural market; hence, factor prices must 
equal the value of marginal products. 
The produced quantity of  bread grain is used for food production, animal feed, and 
exports. The model's third stage represents firms which process and distribute bread 
grain, such as  wholesale buyers, millers, exporters, and foodstuH'producers and retailers. 
Bread grain, in combination with other input factors of labor and capital (which is a 
residual of all other inputs), is used to produce and distribute bread grain products. 
Not much information is available if the downstream industry is able to exert some 
market power to set the prices above marginal cost. To a great extent, the Austrian food 
manufacturing sector is made up of small enterprises. In 1993, about 93,000 employees 
worked in approximately 7,000 enterprises of  food and luxury food industries, which 
implies an average of  about  14 employees per  enterprise (Mazanek, 1995, 1996). 
However, approximately 70% of these enterprises had fewer than 20 employees, and 
accounted for only 8% of  the output. While the concentration ratio in food manufac- 
turing is unclear, there is some evidence of  market concentration in food retailing. 
Aiginger, Wieser, and Wiiger (1999) report a four-firm concentration ratio (CR-4)  of the 
food-retailing sector in Austria of 58% in 1993. Accordingly, we assume some market 
power in the food sector. 
Import  and export of  processed bread grain does not play an important role in 
Austria. According to Astl(1991), the ratio of imports to total consumption of bread and 
baker's  wares is less than 7%. Raab (1994) reports that exports of  flour and flour 
products increased, but were still only 20,000 tons or 4% of domestically processed bread 
grain in 1993. Given these facts, we assume that domestic demand for bread grain 
products equals domestic supply. 
The Policy 
Thus, objectives of  farm policy as stated in national agricultural legislations are 
numerous. There also appears to be a high degree of unanimity about the objectives of 
agricultural policy among developed countries. Following Winters (1987b, 1990), in 
analyzing the objectives of agricultural support in Organization for Economic Cooper- 
ation and Development (OECD)  countries, six categories are  identified: (a)  efficient use 
of  production factors; (b)  support and stabilization of farm income; (c) self-sufficiency 
with agricultural (food) products; (d)  regional, community, and family farm aspects; 
(el environmental protection; and (f)  the assurance of reasonable prices for consumers. 
There is not much doubt among agricultural policy analysts that farm income support 
has been the most important objective over the last few decades (Josling, 1974;  Gardner, 160  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Price 
Figure 3. Bread grain market and policy 
1992).  In general, Austrian agricultural legislation is not different from other developed 
countries, and paragraph 1  (clause 1-5) of  the Landwirtschaftsgesetz (Agricultural 
Status)  includes all six of the objectives identified above (see Gatterbauer, Holzer, and 
Welan, 1993; Ortner, 1997). 
The particular objectives of  bread grain market interventions are stated in the 
Marktordnungsgesetz, and can be summarized as: (a)  safeguarding domestic production; 
(b)  stabilizing flour and bread prices; and (c) securing a sufficient supply and quality of 
bread grain, bread grain products, and animal feedstuffs (Astl, 1989, p. 88; Mannert, 
1991, p. 74). 
Utilized policy instruments to meet stated policy objectives can be illustrated by 
means of figure 3, with Df,  being the domestic demand for bread grain for food produc- 
tion, and D being the total domestic demand for bread grain including demand for 
feeding purposes. Initial domestic supply is represented by S,  and supply including a 
fertilizer tax by St.  World market price is assumed to be perfectly elastic at P,.  Farmers 
obtain a high floor price (P,)  for a specific contracted quantity (or quota) QQ.  Since 
farmers are required to pay a co-responsibility levy (CL,),  the net producer price is 
P,  -  CL,.  Quantities which exceed the quota can be delivered at a reduced floor price 
P,.  Again, farmers' net price is P,  -  CL,,  with CL,  being the co-responsibility levy for 
bread grain beyond the quota. Food processors must buy bread grain at the high price 
PD,  while the price of bread grain for feeding purposes is PE.  Therefore, domestic demand 
for bread grain in food production is Q,,  domestic demand for feeding purposes is 
Q,  -  Q,,  total domestic demand is QE,  and exports are Qx = Qs -  Q,. 
Empirical Implementation 
As discussed above, the main objective of agricultural policy in Austria, as  in most devel- 
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sufficient supply and quality ofbread grain products and animal feedstuffs was the most 
important objective of Austria's bread grain policy in particular (Mannert, 1991).  Hence, 
in this empirical example we concentrate on these two objectives. Regarding the farm 
income objective, it is assumed that the socially desired level of  farm income is the 
actually observed one. For the self-sufficiency level, we assume domestic supply must 
be equal to or greater than domestic demand.'  Therefore, the set of policy objectives in 
our empirical example is z+ = (2:  2 the actually observed farm income, 2;  2 domestic 
demand equals domestic supply). 
Moreover, for simplicity, it is assumed that the actually applied policy instruments 
are the ones available to government. Hence, we do not consider the possibility of  the 
government using other instruments, such as  a set-aside rate or area payments. There- 
fore, the set of available policy instruments is x = (P,,  PE,  CL,,,  CL,,,  Qg ) = (high floor 
price, reduced floor price, co-responsibility  levy on the high floor price, co-responsibility 
levy on the reduced floor price, quota).  Also for simplicity, the analysis does not consider 
that the actual policy included a fertilizer tax. The official objective of introducing a tax 
on fertilizer was soil protection, and hence environmentally motivated. Although it 
would be theoretically possible to also consider this objective of a specific environmental 
quality in the analysis, it would introduce complication to a level beyond the scope of 
this empirical example.' Technically,  one could argue that abstracting  from the environ- 
mental objective is possible if it is separable from all other objectives and optimally met 
by the current level of  fertilizer tax. 
To run the model, 19  specific parameter values must be assumed (see the appendix). In 
contrast to most empirical studies of  this kind, we do not assume one (or a few) specific 
value(s) for each parameter, but rather assume each parameter to be in a plausible range. 
The 19  parameter values and their upper (u)  and lower (I)  limits are  based on an extensive 
literature review and data analysis, described in detail in Salhofer et al. (2001) and 
Salhofer (2001), and are presented in table 1.'  Here we assume a symmetric normal 
distribution N(p, o), with p = (u + 1)12 and o = (p  - u)/1.96, which is truncated at  u and l.1° 
From the assumed parameter ranges, a probability density function of the parameter set 
cp,(b)  can be derived by taking 10,000  independent draws." 
While it could be argued that if government intends to secure self-sufficiency  in every year, implementing a policy which 
intends to reach a self-sufficiency level of  100% might not be enough because of  unfavorable weather in a specific year. 
However, our empirical model is based on data averaged over three years. 
'To  be able to  judge the environmental effects of the bread grain policy, one would have to combine the market model used 
here with a model that simulates biophysical processes, e.g., the Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model. 
In particular, to identify studies providing estimates of relevant parameters for Europe in general and Austria in partic- 
ular, we reviewed the two major European agricultural economics journals [European Review of  Agricultural Economics 
(1973-1999) and Journal  ofAgricultura1  Economics  (1970-199911. In addition,  we systematically  used the literature databases 
AG-ECON, AGRIS, and CAB to find other relevant literature. All in all, more than 70 studies were identified and used to 
derive the values of the model parameters. 
''The  truncated normal distribution and the uniform distribution are  typically employed in comparable studies  (Davis  and 
Espinoza, 1998; Sinabell, Salhofer, and Hofreither, 1999; Zhao, 1999; Zhao et al., 2000; Horan, Claassen, and Howe, 2001; 
Salhofer and Schmid, 2004). Zhao et al. (2000) also use a hierarchical distribution. Zhao (1999) uses a mixture of a truncated 
normal distribution and an  exponential distribution. In our work we also tried a uniform distribution. As expected, the results 
with regard to the central tendency (mean,  median, mode) are not very different from the symmetric normal distribution. 
However, since the results havea higher variance, we found more cases where the optimization problem was difficult to solve. 
"  According to Abler, Rodriguez, and Shortle (19991, if y is a welfare measure to be estimated by the Monte Carlo pro- 
cedure, then with a 95% probability, the margin of error is no greater than e = 1.96/m,  where K is the number of the 
simulations and a2  is the variance of the welfare measure. For the case of the %ADWL  measure, e gives the margin of error 
in percentage points. For all other measures, e must be divided by the mean of the measure and multiplied by 100 to derive 
the margin of  error in percentage  points. With  10,000 simulations, the estimated margin of  error is smaller than 0.7 
percentage points for all measures. 162  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 1. Upper and Lower Limits of Model Parameters 
Model Parameters 
Upper  Lower 
Symbol  Limit (u)  Limit (1) 





Supply Elasticities of Food Industry Input Factors: 
Labor 
Capital 




Cost Shares of Food Industry Input Factors: Labor 
Substitution Elasticity of Bread Grain Production 
Substitution Elasticity of Food Production 
Demand Elasticity of Bread Grain for Feeding 
Demand Elasticity of Bread Grain at  the Consumer Level 
Lerner Indices: 
Operating Inputs Industry 
Agricultural Investment Goods Industry 
Food Industry 
Agricultural  Share  of  Expenditures  for  Bread  Grain 
Products 
Cost of Public Funds  MCF 
DWL of  the actual policy is derived by simulating the welfare effects of  the actual 
policy xA  and of the  non-intervention policy xO,  and calculating the  difference. Repeating 
this procedure for 10,000 alternative parameter sets, we derive a probability distribu- 
tion of the actual DWL. 
Unavoidable deadweight losses (UDWL) are derived by solving the following non- 
linear optimization problem numerically utilizing GAMS software (Brooke, Kendrick, 
and Meeraus, 1988): 
min  DWL(x, xO,  b), 
PD,PE,CLp~,CLp~,QQ>O 
where W,  is the welfare level of farmers, W$  is the welfare level of farmers in the 
actual situation, and Q, denotes net exports. Again, repeating this procedure for 10,000 Salhofer, Schmid, and Streicher  Eficiency of a Policy Intended to Meet Objectives  163 





95%  75% 
Probability  Probability 
Internal  Interval 
Policy Measures  Mean  Median  Mode  Variation  Min.  Max.  from/ to  from / to 
DWL of Actual Policy  158.7  157.9  152.5  14.5  81.7  246.1  115.9-205.4  132.1-186.1 
Unavoidable DWL  67.8  67.1  66.1  9.1  50.6  94.9  57.6-81.7  61.1-74.7 
Avoidable DWL  90.9  90.7  87.7  26.3  6.7  178.7  44.9- 138.2  63.0-118.8 
alternative parameter sets, we derive a probability distribution of UDWL.12 ADWL of 
the actual policy is measured by the difference between the DWL and UDWL. %ADWL 
is calculated by dividing ADWL by DWL and multiplying by 100. 
Empirical Results 
The empirical results are summarized in table 2. As discussed by Davis and Espinoza 
(1998), if we observe that  the results are  not normally distributed, it becomes debatable 
which is the appropriate measure of  central tendency. Based on a Jaque-Bera test, 
normal distribution is rejected for all four reported measures (DWL, UDWL, ADWL, 
%ADWL) at  the 99% significance level. We therefore report the mean, the median, and 
the mode in table 2. At the mean, the DWL of the actually observed policy is measured 
to be 159  million Euros ('2) (about  42% of the value of bread grain production), while the 
median is € 158 million and the mode is € 153 million. Therefore, all three measures 
of central tendency give relatively similar results. The coefficient of variation (CV) is 
14.5%. However, a minimum value of  € 82 million and a maximum value of  € 246 
million show how different the results are, depending on the chosen parameter values. 
This is also reflected in the 95% and 75% confidence intervals, which range between 
€ 116 million and € 205 million, and € 132 million and € 186 million, respectively. In 
the case of the optimal policy, the unavoidable DWL values are significantly smaller with 
a mean, median, and mode of € 68, € 67, and € 66 million, respectively. The CV for 
the optimal policy, at  9%, is smaller than the CV for the actual policy. Given this, the 
probability distribution of %ADWL has a high mean, median, and mode of 56%, 58%, 
l2 Since (6)  is a complex nonlinear optimization problem, deriving solutions crucially depends on provided starting values. 
In a first trial with the same starting values for all 10,000 problems, several hundred problems could not be solved. To 
endogenize the starting values, we use the information of solved problems. In particular, we derive a response surface by 
estimating a simple OLS regression of the following form: 
19 
S,  =ao  +  a,bi  + e, 
i=l 
where Si  denotes the values of those variables for which starting  values are needed (mainly quantities, prices, and welfare 
measures), and b,  represents the exogenously given parameters. The estimates of the parameters 6,  and $ are afterwards 
used  to derive specific starting values for every single optimization problem by  plugging  the parameters bi  into the 
nonstochastic version of the above equation. 164  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
%ADWL (in mil. €) 
Figure 4. Kernel density function of %ADWL 
and 62%, reflecting the inefficiency of the actual policy. The confidence intervals show 
that this is true over a wide range of  assumed parameter values.13 The distribution 
derived for %ADWL  is also illustrated as a Gaussian kernel density function in figure 
4. 
With the optimal policy, self-sufficiency is exactly achieved and there are no 
expensive exports. This result is derived by decreasing the lower price PE on average by 
32%. The quota (QQ)  is decreased on average by 52% and is much closer to the domestic 
demand for food production than in the observed situation. To achieve the income 
transfer objective, the producer price PD  is increased on average by 13%. In all except 
15  cases, the co-responsibility levy (CL,)  is zero. The co-responsibility levy CLpD  is used 
in only 12%  of the cases and is on average 22% of the actual situation. This result is in 
accordance with findings reported by de Gorter and Meilke (1989, pp. 597-598),  who 
argue that a co-responsibility levy is a second-best policy, while the first-best policy 
would be to reduce the prices (P,,  PE)  directly. 
It  is important to remember that in this empirical example we have assumed the set 
of available instruments is the set of instruments actually used. Therefore, the inefici- 
encies reported are  caused by combining the actually used instruments in a suboptimal 
way, i.e., utilizing them at wrong levels. However, the analysis could be extended by 
assuming government might also utilize other instruments such as  deficiency payments 
or set-asides. 
l3 Assuming a uniform distribution of the parameter values between the upper and lower boundaries does not change the 
means, medians, and modes significantly, but, as  expected, causes higher coefficients of variation and wider probability 
intervals. Salhofer, Schmid, and Streicher  Eficiency of a Policy Intended to Meet Objectives  165 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Given the substantial variation in estimated policy measures, it is helpful to identify 
those parameters which most influence the results, and on which additional effort 
should focus. Here, we concentrate on the impact of parameter values on %ADWL. 
One way to obtain information about the importance of an  exogenous parameter with 
respect to some variable of  interest (%ADWL) is to calculate a sensitivity elasticity 
(Zhao et al., 2000; Horan, Claassen, and Howe, 2001): 
where EO/aADWL,b,  measures the percentage change in %ADWL if parameter bi changes by 
1%. Given the complex nature of the relation between bi and %ADWL, Eo/aADWL,bi  cannot 
be calculated directly. However, it can be derived numerically.14  One possibility is to 
estimate a response surface. Here we follow Zhao et al. (2000)  and describe the non- 
linear relationships between the %ADWL and model parameters by a second-order 
approximation-i.e.,  a quadratic polynomial, comprising a constant, the 19 parameters 
bi  (CIA,  CIB, CI~,  UJ,  A,  &A,  EB,  EG,  EH,  EJ, EK, qE,  qF, us,  OF,  LF, LG,  LH, MCF), and the 
permutations bi b,  of the products of all 19 parameters:15 
with c,,  ci,  and di, being regression coefficients, and e an error term. 
Equation (8)  is  estimated using the 10,000 parameter sets drawn from the parameter 
distribution and the results for %ADWL as  derived in the simulations. An OLS estima- 
tion of equation (8) exhibits an extremely good fit (R2  = 0.994). Based on a White test, 
the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity is rejected; consequently, the White proce- 
dure to derive a heteroskedasticity-consistent  covariance matrix is used (White, 1980). 
About 45% of the coefficients are significant at  the 99%  level, 53% at  the 95% level, and 
59% at the 90% level. 
Given the regression results, the sensitivity elasticity of %ADWL to parameter bi at 
any parameter point b can be derived by partial differentiation of the response surface 
(Zhao et al., 2000): 
"The most direct way would probably be to use the 10,000  values of %ADWL derived above as  "basen values and calculate 
10,000  "new" %ADWL values with one parameter bi changed by  1%. Subtracting the 10,000 base values from the 10,000  new 
values and dividing the differences by the base values leads to 10,000 elasticity values. However, to derive the 10,000 new 
%ADWL values, 10,000 additional nonlinear optimization problems must be solved. While this procedure is theoretically 
possible, it is practically cumbersome and computationally expensive. Additionally, this would have to be performed for all 
19 parameters, leading to a total of 190,000 optimization problems. 
l5 Zhao (1999); Horan, Claassen, and Howe (2001); and Salhofer (2001) use first-order approximations of the data-gener- 
ating process. 166  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 3. Influence of Parameters on Model Outcome 
95% 
Probability  Mean Absolute 
Interval  Mean  Percentage 
Standard  Absolute Error  Error 




















Note: Single, double,  and triple asterisks (*)  denote statistical  significancelevels  ofgo%,  95%, and 99%,  respectively. 
Plugging the 10,000  parameter sets  drawn from the  parameter distribution and their 
resulting %ADWL values into equation (9),  a distribution of elasticity values is derived. 
The mean of these 10,000 elasticity values represents the average sensitivity elasticity 
across the range of parameter bi.  The results are presented in table 3. A 1%  change in 
the parameter  A  (the agricultural share of  expenditures for bread grain products) 
increases the %ADWL by 2.277% with a standard deviation of 0.751%, and the 95%  prob- 
ability interval between -  1.357%  and 4.028%. Five parameters are significantly differ- 
ent from zero at the 1% significance level, and four more at the 10% level. The three 
parameters with the  highest sensitivity elasticity on average are  the  agricultural share 
of  expenditures for bread grain products (A),  the Lerner index at the food processing 
level (L,),  and the elasticity of substitution in food processing (a,).  These findings sug- 
gest that much of the uncertainty in the model outcome is explained by the uncertainty 
in the parameters representing the food sector. This should not come as  a surprise, since 
a high share of  the value of  the final product is added in the downstream sector. In 
addition, these results also show that in evaluating agricultural policy it is important 
to include the effects on the downstream sector. 
It is important to clarify when observing (for example)  that  A has a higher sensitivity 
elasticity than (for example) LH, this does not necessarily imply A  adds more to the 
uncertainty associated with %ADWL than does L,.  This is because there is a much Salhofer, Schmid, and Streicher  Eficiency of a Policy Intended to Meet Objectives  167 
larger uncertainty about the real value of LH (0.0 s LH  s 0.2) than about the real value 
of  A (0.07 s  A  s 0.9). No value in the subjective probability distribution of  A has more 
than a 12.5% difference from the meanlmode, while in the case of LH  this difference is 
100%.  It  is the combination of the direct influence on the outcome (as measured by the 
sensitivity elasticity) and the  uncertainty about the  parameter range which determines 
the uncertainty a parameter adds to %ADWL. In other words, a highly influential but 
quite precisely known parameter might contribute less to the uncertainty of the model 
outcome than a moderately influential parameter with a wide range of possible values. 
To identify those parameters which add the most uncertainty to %ADWL, we follow 
Zhao (1999) and calculate the mean absolute error (MAE) and the mean  absolute 
percentage error (WE)  associated with each of our 19 parameters. Specifically, if all 
parameters bi E b are  known with certainty except for parameter b,, the MAE associated 
with using some value bi = by  is calculated as: 
where f  (b)  is the response surface. However, the parameter values in b are not known 
with certainty. Therefore, using their  joint distribution, equation (10)  can be augmented 
as follows: 
Equation (11)  allows for uncertainty in both the value of parameter bi and the values of 
all other parameters bj+,. 
Numerically, the MAE  associated with parameter bi can be approximated in the 
following way. Each of the 10,000  parameter sets b is consecutively  treated as  the "true" 
set, which, plugged into the surface response function, yields a "true" value for %ADWL 
= f  (b)  in equation (10). The mean absolute error for some parameter bi in equation (10) 
is approximated by using our 10,000 values for bi to calculate f(b  I bi  = b;), keeping 
parameters bj,, equal to the  "true"  parameter values. This process yields 10,000  absolute 
errors I f(b) -  f(b  I bi = br) I . Since the distribution of  parameter bi has already been 
utilized in the sampling of b,, the unweighted average of these 10,000 absolute errors 
yields the MAE in equation (10).  To allow for the  fact that all parameters are stochastic, 
this procedure is replicated for each of  our 10,000 parameter sets, and the MAE  in 
equation (11)  is the unweighted average of  10,000 x  10,000 = 10'  evaluations of  the 
surface response function. The MAPE is derived analogously as a simple average of 
lo8  absolute percentage errors. 
The results are reported in table 3. The most important lesson is a corroboration of 
our initial assumption that the sensitivity elasticity can indeed be a misleading indicator 
for the identification of those parameters which contribute most to the uncertainty of 
the model outcome. With an  elasticity of 2.28, the agricultural share of expenditures for 
bread  grain products  (A)  is the parameter  with the highest sensitivity elasticity. 
However, with respect to model uncertainty (as  measured by both MAE and WE),  the 
most influential parameter is the elasticity of  substitution at the food industry level 
(aF),  whose WE  of 13.1%  is more than double A's  WE  of 6.4%. The reason for this 
result is that A's  parameter range (from 0.07 to 0.09) is substantially smaller than the 
range of oF (from 0.50 to 1.50). 168  August ZOO6  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Agricultural policy usually seeks to meet multiple objectives. Consequently, many agri- 
cultural economists (e.g., Nerlove, 1958; Josling, 1969, 1974; Rausser, 1982; Gardner, 
1983;  Just, 1984)  have argued that to effectively  judge an  agricultural policy, measuring 
implied deadweight losses (Dm)  is not sufficient. Rather, the costs must be weighted 
against the benefits. To date, however, very little work exists which actually applies this 
insight and judges the performance of  a policy by taking into account these objectives. 
[An exception is the literature on "transfer efficiency," which basically evaluates the 
efficiency of  agricultural policy with regard to the objective of income transfer, usually 
neglecting all other objectives. For a review of this literature, see Bullock and Salhofer 
(2003).1 The study at  hand provides a general framework demonstrating how to judge 
a policy intended to meet multiple objectives. 
The empirical example to which our general framework is applied is still simple in 
that we assume only two policy objectives: farm income and self-sufficiency.  Moreover, 
these two objectives are comparably easy to evaluate and implement. It is certainly 
more difficult to model and implement objectives associated with environmental quality 
or regional development. Nevertheless, the study provides the general structure for 
doing so, and is still more sophisticated than many of its predecessors. 
The results of our empirical example for the bread grain policy in Austria between 
1991  and 1993  reveal that the applied policy was very inefficient with respect to the two 
main objectives of income transfer and self-sufficiency. More than 56% of the observed 
DWL could have been avoided by a more efficient combination of the actually used policy 
instruments. 
Unlike earlier studies, we do not assign one (or a few) values to each model 
parameter, but instead assume our model parameters to be in plausible ranges, and 
derive probability distributions of our policy efficiency measures. This procedure is 
applied here to a relatively complex nonlinear optimization problem. Findings confirm 
the importance of such procedures to obtain a more complete picture of the entire range 
of possible results. However, as discussed by Davis and Espinoza (1998), although this 
procedure does improve the analysis with regard to the parameter uncertainty, it 
does not account for the fact that the model structure might be incorrect for explaining 
the markets being analyzed. A first approach for how to address this problem is 
presented by Davis (2001). If the model structure is incorrect, then all the analysis is 
suspect. 
Finally, following Zhao et al. (2000) and Zhao (1999), we use a response surface to 
reveal what parameters most influence the results and on which parameters additional 
research effort (time) should be invested. Concerning the latter, we discuss how 
commonly derived sensitivity elasticities (Zhao  et al., 2000; Horan, Claassen, and Howe, 
2001) might be misleading, and how the mean absolute error or the mean percentage 
error (as suggested by Zhao, 1999) might give a more complete picture. 
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Appendix: 
The Austrian Bread Grain Sector Model 
The supply of inputs used for bread grain production is specified as: 
and 
(A1.b)  Qi = Xi ((1  - Li)pi)"',  (i = G,  H), 
where Qi denotes the quantity supplied,Xi the shift parameter, F',  the  price, ti  the supply elasticity, and 
L,  the  Lerner index of input  fador i. Inputs are  land (A), labor (B), investment goods (G),  and operating 
inputs (HI. 
The bread grain production function is written as: 
0, - 1 
with p = -  and  x  ai=l, 
OS  i=A,B,G,H 
where Q,  denotes the produced quantity of bread grain, Zgs the production function efficiency param- 
eter, ai the distribution parameter of  factor i, p the substitution parameter, and 0, the elasticity of 
substitution between input factors at the farm level. 
The profit-maximization condition (= conditional input demand) is given by: 
and 
where P,  is the gross price, CL,  is the co-responsibility levy for bread grain that exceeds the quota QQ 
(see figure 11, and T, is the fertilizer tax per unit. 
The market-clearing condition for bread grain is represented by: 
The produced quantity of bread grain is used for food (bread grain products) production (Q,),  animal 
feed (Q,),  and exports (Q,). 
The supply of labor (J) and capital (K) for food production are specified as: 
The food production function is given by: 
0, - 1 
with y  = -  and  x  ai=l, 
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where Q,  represents the produced quantity of food, ZQsF  the production function efficiency parameter, 
ai the distribution parameter of factor i, y the substitution parameter, and oF the elasticity of substi- 
tution between input factors at the food industry level. 
Next, derived input demand given some market power in food production is of the form: 
where PF denotes the price of food, PD  the gross price of bread grain under the quota, and LF  the Lerner 
index of  the downstream sector. 
Food demand is written as: 
where QDF  represents the demanded quantity. of  food, XQDF  a shift parameter, and qF  the elasticity of 
demand. 
The market-clearing condition for food is given by: 
The bread grain demand for feeding purposes is written as: 
where XQDE  and qE  are the shift parameter and the elasticity of animal feedstademand, respectively. 
Finally, the initial agricultural share of  expenditures for bread grain products (a), 
(All) 
is necessary to derive the price for bread grain products PF in the calibration process. 
The model consists of 19 variables (QA, QB, Q,,  QH, Q,,  Q,,  PA,  P,,  PC,  pH,  PJ, PK,  Qs, QD,  QE, Qx, 
QSF,  QDFj  PF), six policy instruments (P,,  PE,  CL,,  CL,,  QQ,  TF) [of which two (CL,  and QQ)  are not 
in the model above, but play a role in the welfare calculations], and 32 parameters (E,, E,,  E,,  E,,  E,, 
EK, CIA,  aj,  C~D,  as, OF, TIE, TIF, LC,  LH,  LF,XA,XB,XC,XH,XJ,XK,  ZQS~  ZQSF,XQDF,XQDE,  1, 
MCF) [of which the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) is not in the model above, but plays a role in 
the welfare calculationsl. To calibrate the model, we have information on 12  variables (Q,,  Q,,  Q,,  Q,, 
Qj, Q,,  Qs, QD,  QE,  QX,  QSF, QDF)  and the policy instruments. In addition, we assume values for 19 
parameters (E~,  E~,  E,,  E,,  E~,  E,,  aA,  a,,  aG,  aJ, oS,  oF,  qE,  qF,  LC,  LH,  LF,  a,  MCF). All other variables and 
parameters are derived in the calibration. 